On What Standard Might Taste Stand?

David Hume, in his essay On the Standard of Taste, argues that artistic beauty conforms to an objective standard, which he calls taste. Taste is apprehended by a unique faculty of the human mind in conjunction with reason. Divorced from societal and personal prejudice, these faculties may apprehend those artistic qualities which make the experience of artistic beauty pleasurable. Altogether, this argument seems hard to defend, but it is particularly peculiar in light the tone of skepticism which pervades his epistemic beliefs.

Hume is perhaps best known for his skepticism regarding causality, which raises doubt to almost every a priori proposition, or deductive argument. He points out that when we experience an event, we intern experience the consequences of that event. For instance: when a ball is thrown into the air, it generally comes down. What we do not experience is the necessary link between the ball's rising and it's descent. As far as we know, it could simply be coincidence that the balls falls every time that it is thrown up.

In apprehending knowledge, Hume takes personal experience to be very important. Knowledge, according to Hume, is simply a guess based on probability, which is largely determined by experiencing a thing. The more one has experienced a particular phenomenon, the better one might guess at its probability of occurring in the future. The faculty which apprehends artistic taste operates on this same scheme. Taste, however, is not simply based on probability, but rather on judgments. Judgments are made within a moral framework subject to the calculations of reason. Because Hume does not take much stock in a priori reasoning, moral value is evaluated through effects. If an action produces overall positive effects, then it is considered a good action. In order to best determine if an action is good, a well-wrought reasoning capacity is necessary in order to weigh the multitude of considerations which take place in making judgments. Artistic taste, likewise, requires development to best make judgments based on its apprehension of worthy artistic qualities.

So far, so good; however, this is where things start to get shaky for Hume. He claims that a discerning artistic taste will evince a positive feeling when good art is experienced. The best judgments of this sort come from those who have experienced a great deal of art and who have removed all prejudice from their minds. The problem is, it does not seem that the same artistic qualities will always produce this pleasurable sensation, even in discerning tastes. Hume anticipates this early on in his article and mentions that disagreement exists in general judgments about sensations of taste, but posits that discussion of the particulars shows that the same qualities are held in reverence between all peoples. Despite this position, he still admits that differences in personal taste and cultural taste may differ from one standard. He explains this away as inevitable and ultimately holds the differences produced from these to be insignificant. This move seems wholly inadequate.

Hume makes one large mistake: He defines the worth-discerning character in terms of western conceptions of sagacity. The problem that Hume runs into is his hasty assumption that one might purge oneself of all prejudice. In this, he makes the same mistake as Descartes in assuming that bare reason is the blank slate of the human mind. The problem is, prejudice can never be fully removed. Every person necessarily has a subjective point of view. As such, preferences in taste vary and defy objectification, whether applied to artistic qualities or to distinctions between bitter and sweet. The whole world may agree that sweet things are more pleasing, but that does not mean that I necessarily perceive them to be more pleasurable than a beautifully bitter cup of joe. The western conception of value is largely based on the rational power of the mind, which thrives on complexities. By apprehending complexity, the west feels that it has apprehended some measure of truth. In poetry, complexity is manifest in the wide use of stylistic flourishes, scintillating language, and grand ideas. The more complex a thing is, the more subject it is to the discernment of reason and the more it may be beheld congratulated for its intentionality of form. Ultimately, however, it does not seem that this intellect-centered evaluation is necessarily universal. Beauty may just as easily be apprehended in the frank simplicity of a thing as with its grand complexities. Take many Oriental traditions for instance who put value on separating oneself from the material world. To some perspectives, truth is only found in what is absurd to reason. In this view, the more one trifles over imagined complexities, the tighter one squeezes the knots of one's bindings. So long as Hume ties the value of judgments to effects, he must be content to accept what each person apprehends as beautiful. Subjective justifications can never demonstrate objective value necessarily. A discerning taste is limited by its experience.