Otherness, Career, and Gender

So in class today, we came up with a long list of some characteristics of the Other.  We said that the Other was: weak, an object, private, mysterious, sentimental, domestic, uncontrolled, ignorant, sensual/seductive, immanent, aesthetic, exotic, and so on.  I'd like to look at Otherness and contemporary views on tolerance--particularly gender-tolerance--based a contemporary psychological study.  I’m reading a book right now called Blink by Malcolm Gladwell (great read; Alan Mikkelson gave me the recommendation) in which the author discusses the Implicit Association Test (IAT).  This test, devised by a group of psychologists in 1998, and is based upon the idea that “we make connections much more quickly between pairs of ideas that are already related in our minds than we do between pairs of ideas that are unfamiliar to us” (77).  The test measures the speed with which you associate terms or pairs of terms.

Try taking the test now.  It takes about ten minutes total.  Granted, half of that is annoying surveys, but let’s face it, you’re on the Internet.

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The test starts out with easy associations; it’ll ask you to put male names on one side and female names another side.  People fly through this.  Then the test gets trickier: it then asks you to associate names with paired options: (male or career) and (female or family).  Most people slow down her.  Finally, the test asks you to associate names with (male or family) and (female or family).  Here’s where things break down: most people slow down remarkably on the third test.

There’s no reason to do so.  There is no inherent connection between females and careers, or incompatibility between males and families.  But that what we tend to think.  On the graph below, the two tall black bars in the middle indicate the tendency of the majority of people, who carried a strong association for men-career and women-family, respectively.

Gladwell, however, comes to the rescue here and breaks down the results.  He asks, “does this mean I’m a [sexist]? … Not exactly.  What is means is that our attitudes toward things like [sex] and gender operate on two levels.  First of all, we have our conscious attitudes.  This is what we choose to believe … but the IAT measures something else.  IT measures our second level of attitude, our [sexual] attitude on an unconscious level – the immediate, automatic associations that tumble out before we’ve even had time to think … we may not even be aware of them … the disturbing thing about this test is that it shows that our unconscious attitudes may be utterly incompatible with our stated conscious values” (84-5).

Gladwell goes on to say that “the IAT is more than just an abstract measure of attitudes.  It’s also a powerful predictor of how we act in certain kinds of spontaneous decisions” (85).

At this point, we might have cause to think.  “So what,” we might ask.  “Who cares if we have a fleeting, initial bias toward male superiority?  Those feelings are fleeting, and they can be overcome.  Isn’t that the point of an education, reason, and rational thought?”

So we might think.  But Gladwell goes on to frame this experiment in the overall context of this book, and here’s what’s scary: we put a lot more weight into initial, unconscious, and irrational assertions than we tend to think.  That’s why he calls the book “blink,” because we make a great deal of our assessments within the first two seconds.  It’s what you might call gut instinct: we tend to act first and then justify later.  “Beliefs follow actions,” as Cialdini put it. And here’s the thing: if we can’t choose our unconscious attitudes, as Gladwell suggests, then what’s the point of rational argument?  Better yet, what’s the point of feminist theory?  Shouldn’t we be acting to change culture, rather than talking about it?

And by the way, if you think this one is eye-opening, try taking the race test.  A list of general test can also be found here.

Eliot (George, not T.S.) and Woolf

As I brought up in class today, I was a little surprised that in Woolf's list of great androgynous writers, our dear George Eliot was not among them. I mean, come on, the woman even looks kind of mannish. But more importantly, she seems to have understood that "it is fatal for any one who writes to think of their sex" (904). In the Eliot novels that I have read, Eliot seems to strive incredibly hard to present reality and write from an objective perspective not overshadowed by gender. In her novels, Eliot presents a range of individuals that are all flawed, regardless of gender. She allows each of them the potential for redemption and also gives each of them a realistic human flaw that inhibits their ability to reach happiness and success. In reflecting on her works, I would also venture to say that Eliot strives to avoid the kind of mutually exclusive "Otherness" we talked about in class. Take the characters in Adam Bede for example. Adam Bede represents the idea of the moral and his brother Seth represents the spiritual just as much as the female character of Dinah. And Dinah represents almost no mystery: her character is one of the most open and transparent characters in the plot. When in comes to lacking in self-control, the male character Arthur seems to be the winner in that category as he knowingly seduces a poorer girl he cannot marry. Hysterical and violent moments seem to strike multiple characters, from Adam's attacking Arthur to Lisbeth's numerous frantic moments. Although Eliot does include a more traditional Other female character in Hetty, who presents several of the Other definitions such as weak, superficial and emotional, even Hetty fails to perform the role of typical woman. She lacks Other characteristics such as a maternal instinct, a virtuous manner, or an appreciation for domestic values. Hetty is ignorant and sexual, but Eliot focuses most strongly on depicting Hetty as childish, one of the Other aspects, making it difficult to even pin her into the typical Victorian "fallen woman" category. Overall, there is no standard of values that separate men and women: everyone is subject to the same potential vices and has the same capacity to achieve virtue.
Eliot's other works seems to function in the same way as Adam Bede, and Eliot's struggle for realism seems to transcend her gender. She was, after all, a woman writing under a man's name, which could have opened up the male portion of her mind, as Woolf would argue every woman has. But the Bronte sisters all also published under male pen names, and their works appear to be more distinctly feminine and more focused on feminine issues than Eliot's novels. So why was Eliot able to write in a nearly genderless form? Eliot lived a unique life for a woman in her time, so is it possible that that granted her the same "freedom of mind...liberty of person [and] confidence in [self]" as men, thus allowing her to tap into that male portion of her mind while still in touch with her female perspective (901)? Or perhaps Eliot just was a writer who "used both sides of [her] mind equally," and somehow discovered the secret to doing this on her own (904).
But all of this brings me back to my original question: Why doesn't Woolf mention Eliot? In fact, in her list of androgynous authors, not a single woman is named. Is Woolf in some way thinking it is harder to women to write in an androgynous form? A male author simply has to overcome his tendency in "asserting his own superiority," whereas a woman has to overcome being subjected to this sense of inferiority and is perhaps more likely to try to make a point and gain validation after going unheard for so long (902). Then there is the issue that even in Woolf's time, men still possess a greater social and economic freedom than women, and therefore it might be easier for them to feel equal: they only have to relax their pride, whereas women are trying to gain lost ground. So perhaps women might be apt to overemphasize their femininity, or feel inclined to prove themselves by overindulging in their male perspectives? I'm not sure if Woolf thought any of this at all, I'm just throwing it out there. And mostly I just want to complain that Eliot got ignored, because I do like Middlemarch.

Cheating! More Russians!

After class today I read this article. In case you don’t make it through the six pages, it’s about Lisa Taddeo, a female writer, who goes under cover on the website Ashley Madison.

Ashley Madison is a social networking site for people who are involved with a partner but wish to have an affair. It’s not a secret; their slogan is “Life is Short. Have an Affair.” Initially, when I heard about it, I though, whatever, there are lots of seedy internet websites, not a surprise. However, this site is a little bit more than that. To begin with, it is successful. So far they have tried to endorse four sports stadiums, three arenas, and one airport, (Sky Harbor thankfully chose dignity and debt). However, creepiest fun fact to note is their membership base. They have 8 million and are growing.

What does this have to do with Lit? Crit.?

Well. Let me tell you.

In the article, Lisa Taddeo notes how the men she met weren’t (solely) after sex, they were after meaning. Meaning through long soul exposing emails. Meaning through the demonization of “her” aka their wives and fiancés. Meaning through someone new. All of this relied entirely on their rhetoric.

And even more so, their conversations relied on the changeability of language, like Bakhtin discusses. Just as Caitlin went through the meaning of he word twilight, Taddeo examines the use of romantic rhetoric. Bakhtin says “every extra-artistic prose discourse- in any of its forms quotidian, rhetorical, scholarly- cannot fail to be oriented toward the ‘already uttered’” (1090).

In relation to Ashley Madison, this meant that it didn’t matter that the wife was reduced to a pronoun, for Taddeo, any utterance of affection is viewed through the lens of a broken wedding vow. The emotional affair, even though not physically consummated, destroyed the value of the men’s words just as our knowledge of the existence of Stephanie Meyer’s stories have destroyed any innocent rendering of the word twilight.

Read the article. What do you think? Are Bakhtin’s ideas about linguistic progressions comparable with extramarital affairs?

Behaviorist: "My thoughts don't explain my behavior." Austin: "That's what she said."

Today we came up with a bunch of statements that didn't have any literal or empirical truth-value; statements like "ow" or "whatever" or "step on a crack..."  A couple of these were controversial, but for the most part, these sentences were able to be translated into demonstrable behaviors.

One thing I'd like to point out, however, is that even these translations don't really escape Austin's (implied) claim that getting to literal verifiability is impossible.  Everything's a metaphor of a metaphor, and so on.  We've heard this before.  But translating abstract expressions or thoughts into observable behaviors ends up turning into behaviorism.

There are to types of behaviorism: methodological and philosophical.  Methodological behaviorism was a bunch of early 20th century psychologists getting fed up with the fact that with the technological limitations of the time, it was basically impossible to observe internal mental states (and pretty much still is, actually).  So, the new "method" became a strict study of behaviors.  Philosophical behaviorists, on the other hand, took this one step further, claiming that mental states are logically reducible to behaviors (i.e. to talk about a mental state, such as feeling happy, is really just the same thing as saying that, for example, I'm smiling).

Basically, philosophical behaviorism was a really, really dumb movement.  For one thing, it claims that there are no internal mental states...which is problematic.  For another, it claims that mental states (seeing as they don't really exist) can't cause behaviors.  Clear counterexample: I wore a hooded sweatshirt today because I knew it was going to rain.  The fact that my thoughts caused my behavior seems commonsensically true, and yet, the behaviorist has to deny that this is the case.  At best, the behaviorist is going to cite other behaviors to explain my behavior, at which point we ask, what caused those other behaviors?  More behaviors, apparently.  And so on.

Fortunately, behaviorism as a whole is basically dead.  But my point is that it's very much a child of logical positivism: it's searching for an empirical validity that just isn't there.  And that's really what Austin's driving at.  In any case, what I found most interesting was the fact that our first response to get empirical validity out of the statements/idioms we wrote on the board was to translate them into behaviors...which is exactly what the behaviorist movement tried to accomplish.  Unfortunately, however, I think it's pretty clear that Austin wins out in the end; it seems to be just as hopeless an endeavor to try and find fixed empirical validity in language as it is to try and find fixed empirical validity in mental states.

Repression and Responsibility

In Doug's lecture last week, he referenced Derrida, who had drawn a very interesting connection between the history of religion and the history of responsibility.  In both, he says, mystery is never destroyed--it is only repressed.  Doug links this repression to the forensic analysis of contemporary crime dramas, in which graphic illustrations create the illusion that government surveillance is widespread and infallible.  Humans are reduced to DNA evidence, and if you commit a crime, they will find you.

Heinous crimes are rampant, so surveillance is justified; our government doesn't make mistakes, and DNA doesn't lie, so if you have something to fear, then you must have done something wrong.

*Cue black-bag whipped over character's head from behind.  Character screams, and the scene changes to a cheerful outdoor environment.  Scream echoes, then fades into the background.*

It's a great cultural analysis, and you could probably take Doug's analysis down a Marxist road if you so inclined.  However, I'm more interested in the idea that we can never really destroy mystery.

The word "mystery" means "that which remains unknown."  It's funny how the meaning of this word is changing.  Now, we tend to take it to mean something like "riddle": something solvable, or with a clear answer.  Hence the title show "Unsolved Mysteries," which should just make any English major's head explode.  If it's a mystery, then isn't the idea that it's unsolved redundant?  If it's unsolved, then shouldn't we be spending less time filming it, and more time solving it?  If we can't solve it, then what makes us think there's even a clear answer to the matter?  If there's no clear answer, then why are we still watching?

And I think that's the key.  I think that as a society, we tend to believe that everything can be reduced to a clear explanation.

Of course, that doesn't mean that thing is a correct explanation, or even a coherent one.  It only has to contain the illusion of clarity.  It has to "make sense"; not "make fact."  There's a difference.*

Along these lines though, the various branches (with some overlap, of course) are remarkably quick to claims of reduction when pressed hard enough.  Christians will tell you everything is reducible to God.  Sociologists will tell you everything is reducible to human interaction.  Psychologists will tell you everything is reducible to internal mental states.  Chemists will tell you everything is reducible to chemical events.  Physicists will tell you everything is reducible to physics.  Mathematicians will tell you everything is reducible to mathematical axioms.

Sidenote: it's not clear that any one of these approaches is correct (though physicists are usually the most adamant about telling us otherwise).  The "reductionism versus holism" debate is a lot more controversial than it's commonly made out to be.

But in any case, those are our explanations.  All of them are defenses against the unknown; all of them are an attempt to make sense of things.  That doesn't mean that they're wrong, but it's important to understand the motivations underlying them.

Literary theory isn't an exception.  It's trying to make sense of something that will never be--and perhaps should never be--fully comprehended.  We do not solve mysteries, but merely repress them.  We look at things like genre, literary devices, and psychology and come away thinking that we understand a work, when in reality all we've done is comfort ourselves with the thought that the infinite unknown before us, around us, and inside of us has somehow been diminished...suppressed...repressed.

John Locke conceived of what he called nominal essences, in compared to real essences.  Nominal essences are simple ideas that have been assembled and given names.  They're arbitrary constructions based on wordplay, and they exist in the mind alone.  Real essences, like Kant's noumenal essences, represent the elusive reality of which our faculties can never quite grasp.

Every time we create structure, we create something nominal and external.  Every time we read a book, or observe a painting, or listen to music, we create something nominal and external.  Every time we philosophize about nominal and real essences, we create something nominal and external.

In a way, repression is a bit like crime in CSI.  If you commit it, they will find you.  I think that's why I find intellectual history so fascinating: every great movement--every single one--has committed some thought-crime and shooed it under the rug.  And inevitably, the forerunner of the next great movement will then--with sadistic glee, usually--unveil the problem for all to see, all the while repressing their own, and the revolution is set...until the next one, that is.

I'm not sure what to type anymore.  I think that's because I don't think there's a clear answer to what I'm trying to argue.  But that's my point.  There are lots of answers, and there are lots of explanations.  But what is clear is that the complex ones cannot be equated to, or reduced, to simple ones based on the idea of composition alone.  And yet, we nevertheless accept the idea that a person can be reduced to a collection of chemical states.  Or a collection of mental states (Freud).  Or a collection of feelings (Romantics).  Or a collection of Ideas (Plato).

It doesn't seem to matter whether they're right.  What seems to matter is that they've made sense--that they're repressed the mystery.  At least for now.

 

*I am indebted to Dr. David Wang, my aesthetics professor, on this point.

"Hell is Other People"

So I started with a diagram about something totally different, and ended up with this. Certainly not the most interesting form, I know (props to Caitlin and Pax - must be something at the Inklings theme house that breeds genius) but let me try to explain this.

I decided to surround all my arguments on the way culture is viewed by these theorists. It seems (for most of them) inescapable, but for different reasons. I have culture working in two broad ways: in conflict with the idea of "self" and as seen in the way we comprehend. These two subcategories I broke down even further into two other subcategories. For Self, which I'm using here more to mean the thing for what it really is, is broken into Individual and Natural World. The Individual is obviously just that - the single human being, particularly focusing on the intellectual aspect. The Natural World is both nature and the natural biology of humans, which I'll talk a little bit about later. On the Comprehension side, I've got culture as being necessary in the understanding of a text, and insignificant to understanding. Some of the figures could have crossed into several of these distinct categories, but for the sake of simplicity and not confusing myself, I kept it pretty basic.

Most of these figures are pretty self-explanatory as to why they are located where they are, but I'll note a few of them just for clarification. The fellows under Individual seem to feel than in one way or another, the cultural dictates the way the individual thinks or lives, generally in contrast to the way the individual might choose to think or live for themselves were they outside of culture. Nietzsche I have in Conflict with the Individual self and the articles in the Natural World. Nietzsche argued that studying nature is irrelevant because we can never see the thing in itself, thanks to the lenses we have developed for ourselves through what culture has taught us. Kant doesn't seem to think we can understand anything, so I just put him in conflict with everything. When it comes to Freud and Lacan, the natural human state (the subconscious or the id, whatever you want to call it) is repressed by the social constructions individuals have on themselves, thus both the intellectual individual and the physical one would be at odds with culture. In terms of comprehension, Hume and Schleiermacher both rely on cultural context for understanding. Aristotle's theory of poetry is based on the culture of his time and how a text functions successfully within that realm, and Augustine notes that we need to do a contextual reading. As for those under the Insignificant category, they seem more concerned with the individual than the culture. And that's the basics of it.

Jean Toomer's Hypocrisy Defends New Criticism

As most of you know, I actually like New Criticism. Yeah, yeah it's passé and it's elementary. However, despite its canonical/"Traditional" elitism, there is an undeniable accessibility to its school of thought. Wimsatt and Beardsley state, "we ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if the author at all, only by biographical act of interference" (1234), by giving all emotional and dramatic power to the speaker, the emotion acts as a universal. Meaning, anyone who has been affected by the said emotion can relate to the speaker. The author or poet's intent is negated because the work or art (I am going to state they are synonymous) is capturing a moment of catharsis.

Later critics and New Historicists claim that the biography and culture is crucial to the text. Although that is a discussion for a later date, it insinuates the author's life after the work has been created should be taken into account. I argue that at times, consideration of the author may be detrimental to the work and its influence. Take Jean Toomer's Cane for example (you're welcome, Pax and Natz). Jean Toomer published Cane in 1923, during a period in his life where he felt forced to assimilate to states north of the Mason-Dixon line. He yearned to return to the South, and believed he would become more whole and more human if he was (re)introduced to his slave ancestors. At the time, he was proud of his race, and believed it was a time for Black Americans to stand together and salvage their waning history. However, despite Cane's popularity and success, Toomer betrayed his heritage and adamantly said he was "not black." In his unpublished autobiography, Earth-Being, Toomer writes that his desire to connect with his roots was a phase in his life.

Should these facts influence a Cane reader? I do not think so. Although Toomer's later life seems to undercut the integrity and sentiments of Cane, I do not believe it should cast a shadow on its merits. Wimsatt and Beardsley write, "the use of biographical evidence need not involve in intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of this words and the dramatic character of his utterance" (1240). In many ways, Toomer captures his personal meanings and emotions in Cane, however, if we include all his personal context these meanings and emotions may shift, for his later criticism on Cane conflicts with his beliefs at the time.

Although Jean Toomer is a narrow example of the merits of a closed text, it reflects an issue that New Critics acknowledge and address. Bash it all you want, but humans are not consistent. Therefore, we must take try and provide concretes to prevent the text or work from growing absurd.

Theorists Primary Concerns

So this is my diagram, and I apologize for the fact that it isn't super tidy and computer generated, but that is my way of saying that sometimes theory is messy.

I decided to organize the diagram according to the primary concerns of these theorists. Obviously, we read them because their ideas are applicable to literary criticism, but some of these people were developing structures to help us understand the world through art. Others wanted to change the world, or analyze the way words work. Some wanted to defend their own practices. For this reason, I began by dividing the theorists into two main camps. The ones who dealt with the world outside of literature as a focus, and the ones interested in what makes good art. I put Kant, Hume, and Sidney in the category of general aesthetics, because their concern is answering the most basic questions, such as: What is beauty? Or taste? Or the purpose of art? Hegel and Nietzche also fit in this category, but I gave them their own group because they have a particular bias for music, suggesting that language and image are not as adequate as a form of expression.

On the Reality side of things I have three categories: Philosophical, Practical, and Scriptural. The distinction I make between the practical and the philosophical is that the people on the practical side had an agenda, whereas the philosophers were more concerned with their thoughts and just understanding the way the world works in general. Hegel, Plato, Aristotle, and Nietzsche belong there, in my opinion. The Scripture club is clearly made up of Augustine, Schleiermacher, and Maimonides. The practical side has two categories. There are the psychologists, whose theories were the ones that they themselves used, then there are those who hoped for large scale cultural change which they could not effect in and of themselves. This cultural change fell into the categories of gender and economic reform. Although Lacan had a psychiatric practice, he is much more of a theorist, so I connected him to de Saussure.

De Saussure is on his own line in between art and reality because the study of linguistics shows how language works as a system in our day to day "real" world, thus lying somewhere between the realms of art and reality.

Eating Literary Theory: Exploring language and Rhetoric

The Teeth:

As you can see, some of the philosophers, especially those who introduced revolutionary thought or theory are represented in teeth. The location of the teeth and closeness to others reflects corresponding theories or ideas. For example, Sidney compliments Aristotle's belief in the value of poetry. Aristotle addressing Plato's concerns with language echo Sidney's writing. The correlation between tooth to philosopher/theorist also suggests his or her (who are we kidding, his) importance to thought. Plato is a Central Incisor because he bites and begins the dialogue of thought. Obviously, my personal choice reveals where I place my toothy theorists, however, the merits of such thinkers as Saussure introduce causal thought in his signified/signifier. Although, with revolutionary thought comes the need to refine and evaluate, such as the case for Kant (who critiques and analyzes aesthetic theory), and Horkheimer and Adorno who stress the application of Marxist theory.

The Food Hole:

Due to my lack of interest in Romantic/Transcendentalist theory, I place these indulgent men in the back of the mouth. Yeah... I mean they deserve a spot in the mouth, however, I find their boring ideas and lack-luster poetry to be associated with food and swallowing. (As in forcing myself to swallow.)

The Tongue:

Sure, Hume is all about taste, however, the tongue is also a very sexy muscle. So sexy only Freud can own it. Although we did not read much about his sexual stages, he is the only theorist to suggest an oral stage is innate in human development. Psych 101, you treat me.

The Lips and Jaw:

the lips are distinctly aesthetic and typically feminine. Therefore, I associate Hume along with our female thinkers in the lips. Especially Wollstonecraft, she's all about feminism through rhetoric. Nietzsche deserves the jaw. Not because I find him to be foundation, rather, because he loves to yap his jaw and offend the masses. Correction: herd.

Plato and Aristotle have impacted the thought of all of the theorists we have looked at (with their theories regarding forms and systematic analysis, respectively), so I began with them. Then I branched out. Augustine drew upon Platonic thinking when interacting with linguistic theory, and Schleiermacher and de Saussure were directly influenced by Augustine’s ideas regarding signification in hermeneutics. De Pizan was greatly influenced by Plato’s ideas of forms, but also by the dialogue format of Republic. Wollstonecraft followed in de Pizan’s footsteps by contemplating the subjects of female education and perceived wickedness. Theorists such as Sidney and Maimonides rely heavily upon both Plato and Aristotle. Sidney’s Defence reads like a response to Republic, and he depends upon Aristotle’s Poetics to help form many of his linguistic arguments. Maimonides drew upon Plato’s reverence of epistemic humility and Aristotle’s methods of literary criticism. Aristotle’s theories on literary analysis shaped many of the ideas of the theorists we have read. Hume and Hegel use Aristotle’s thoughts on systematic analysis to shape their literary theory. Kant directly responds to Hume’s skepticism in his Critiques. Coleridge uses Kant’s rational critiques and shares in Schleiermacher’s fascination with contemplating ingrained philosophical oppositions. Emerson’s work is also directly influenced by Schleiermacher’s reliance upon limitless numbers of systems, and he is connected with Coleridge through their close friendship and sharing of ideas. Wordsworth uses both Coleridge and Emerson in developing his hierarchy of language. These theorists connect with Hegel, who directly influenced nearly the entire right side of my diagram. Hegel’s ideas regarding synthesis, systems and relationships inspired Lacan’s interpretations of Freud’s theory and Marx and Engels theories on social determination and capitalistic impacts on society. These ideas presented by Marx and Engels went on to shape Nietzsche’s need to determine the genealogy of any term when trying to decipher meaning, shifted Horkheimer and Adorno from idealist to materialist views, influenced Freud’s ideas of fetishism, and Althusser’s theories which contemplated many of the same questions. The ideas of these theorists also work in relation with de Saussure’s ideas of semiology, which helped form Barthes thoughts surrounding grammar and narrative.

All Roads Lead to Plato (Warning: Possible Road Closures)

As we've continued through the theorists, it seemed every other one had some aspect of their theory that was tied to Plato. Thus: the Map of Greater Literary Theory. Let's take a tour, shall we?
Beginning at the city of Platopolis, one can wander north along Language to find such other metro-areas as Lacanville (warning: as clothes do not truly exist, this is a nudist colony) and de Saussureburg (warning: there are signs everywhere, but good luck figuring them out as this town is home to the famed Arbitrary Fields). If you want to visit Freudson (formerly Freudsmother) and the looming Towers of Envy from Lacanville, you WILL need to travel through Saussureburg (along the pallus-highway). To get to Nietszcheshire from Platopolis, one needs to brave the Dark Forest of "No Truth," a great obstacle to the Form-oriented Platopolitan. All of these cities explore language and its aribitrary or even treacherous nature.
Whilst in Lacanville, though, one can visit the mother-city of Hegelburg, connected by recognition. Now, be warned, Platopolitan: you are entering the area that houses the Lake of Genius, where art is considered...good. From Hegelburg one can travel along the spirit of the times to Emersonville, or take free-play or the artist-as-genius paths to the Nature Valley, home to the split-cities of STC-Ridge and Wordsworthsonville. Be warned, however; ever since the Wall of Awkward Estrangement was built, the two cities have had barely any contact with each other. You must go around the wall, along the art-is-good road, to reach Aristotopolis.
Aristotopolis is the largest city outside of Platopolis; they are, in fact, rival cities. Located at the banks of the Physical is Real River, Aristotopolis sits pretty on the art-is-good freeway, leading the smaller Sidneyville. However, if you take hermenteutics to the north-east, you will find several branches that lead to such locales as Maimonidesburgstein, home to the massive Lightning Rod of Perfect Reading--surpassed only by the Towers of Envy to the northwest and alternately obscured/revealed by thick clouds (warning: constant lightning storms have prompted an indefinite fire-danger protocol). Along the same path (or, if traveling from Maimonidesburgstein, along the literal/figurative byway), is the bustling city of Augustinton (home to the one of the largest inter-linguistic schools in the area). Back along the hermeneutics, one can find out in the verdant valleys of multiple interpretations the city of Schleiermachervilleburgtonson and, if one is brave enough to tackle the massive peak of Mount Argument, one can find de Pizanville, a city set aside from all others and with an overwhelming female majority.
To the east of Platopolis one can travel southerly on the abstract, or there no 'real' physical world road, but one will then need to cross the Peaks of Dangerous Art, the last (and relatively smaller) part of the greater Artistic Mountain range (which blocks Platopolis completely from the art-loving cities to the southwest--though rumors persist that there are small goat trails throughout the treacherous mountain range). If one can pass through the Peaks of Dangerous Art, one can reach Barthesburg (which houses many libraries, though no one visits them--it's all in your head, the locals say) and further along, Kantianville. If you take the standard-of-art road, and are willing to cross the Physical is Real River, you can reach Humeston.
But you can also take mimesis out of Platopolis, branching off to find Horkheimer/Adorno/burg near the Mass Art Pond (fed from the great Mimetic Sea via the Culture Industry Deltas), or continuing to find Marx/Engels/ville/burg, right on the banks of the Commodity Creek (also fed from the Mimetic Sea). From Marx/Engels/ville/burg (or from mimesis, if one is traveling from Platopolis), you can take the people-as-ideology (capitalism) road to Althusserton.
And, if you are truly a brave Platopolitan, you can travel along an obscure branch of mimesis to find Wollestonecraftston, but it is a distant city, beyond the Valley of Feminine Education. There are rumors that de Pizanville is brokering an alliance with Wollestonecraftston; they claim that is for the purposes of education and at the bidding of Reason, but Freudson citizens persist that the females are staging a coup out of jealousy for their Towers of Envy.